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NOTE 
Due Process and Parole Revocation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Daryl Standlee was convicted-of rape in 1959 and sentenced 
to a maximum of sixty years' imprisonment.• He was paroled on 
September 29, 1970. Less than a year later, Standlee was arrested 
on charges which included kidnapping, assault, and attempted 
rape. A parole-revocation hearing was convened. At the request 
of his counsel, however, the hearing was continued pending the 
completion of Standlee's criminal trial on the same charges. 
At that trial, the complainants identified Standlee as their 
assailant. He countered with the testimony of two alibi witnesses. 
Standlee's girl friend and a Mrs. Merrill testified that he had 
been in Portland on the night of the· offense, which had been 
committed in Seattle. The trial court found that Mrs. Merrill's 
testimony created a reasonable doubt as to Standlee's guilt. 
[T]he testimony of Mrs. Merrill impressed me, not only her 
testimony but her appearance and demeanor upon the witness 
stand. . . . [T]o me her testimony is the one that weighed the 
scales of balance, whichever way they would fall . . . . [S]he left 
a reasonable doubt in my mind as to whether or not this defendant 
was the man who committed the offense. 2 
Accordingly, the court acquitted Standlee of all charges. 
Thereafter, the state reconvened the parole-revocation hear-
ing and presented the same evidence which at trial had not sus-
tained a criminal conviction. But since Standlee was unable to 
pay Mrs. Merrill's travel expenses, her testimony was read into 
the record from the trial transcript. Her appearance and de-
meanor, which the trial court had found decisive, could not be 
considered. The Parole Board found that the preponderance of 
the evidence indicated that Standlee had committed the crimes 
charged. Accordingly, it revoked his parole and ordered him re-
committed for a fifteen-year term beginning June 21, 1971.3 
Standlee's quest for habeas corpus relief in state court was 
1. Washington law requires the sentencing judge to impose the maximum statutory 
sentence. The actual time served is determined by the state's parole board. See Mempa 
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 131 n.2 (1967). 
2. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting trial judge), 
3. See Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1975), 
120 
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unsuccessful. 4 He then petitioned the federal district court for a 
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel as embodied in the fifth5 and fourteenth6 amendments 
barred the revocation of his parole. Specifically, he urged that his 
acquittal at trial had established that he had not perpetrated the 
crimes charged and that the state was estopped to relitigate that 
issue. 
The district court held that revocation of parole is a punitive 
sanction7 and that the case was therefore controlled by the rule 
the Supreme Court propounded in Coffey v. United States:8 when 
a defendant has been acquitted of criminal charges, the acquittal 
bars, on principles of res judicata, relitigation by the state of the 
issue of guilt in any subsequent civil suit to impose a punitive 
sanction. 9 The Coffey rule applied, the district court concluded, 
even though the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof 
used at the revocation hearing required a lesser showing of guilt 
than did the reasonable-doubt standard used at trial. The district 
court therefore issued the writ of habeas corpus.10 
The court of appeals reversed.11 It described parole revoca-
tion as a remedial rather than punitive sanction12 and accordingly 
held the Coffey rule inapplicable .. Because of the different stan-
dardef of proof in triminal and revocation proceedings, a differ-
ence which it felt had been approved by the Supreme Court, 13 the 
4. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974). 
5. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1970) (collateral estoppel inheres in 
the fifth amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy); note 177 infra. 
6. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fourteenth amendment due process 
clause makes the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause applicable to the states). 
7. Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
8. 116 U.S. 436 (1886). 
9. 116 U.S. at 443. 
10. Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
11. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977). 
12. Revocation of parole is remedial rather than punitive, since it seeks to 
protect the welfare of parolees and the safety of society .... The termination of 
parole results in a deprivation of liberty and thus is a grievous loss to the parolee. 
But the harshness of parole revocation does not alter its remedial nature. 
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977). 
13. "This lesser standard has been recognized by the Supreme Court as one of the 
crucial factors distinguishing parole revocation from criminal proceedings. See Morrissey 
v. Brewer ••.• It also i~ the reason why appellee had his parole revoked even though he 
was acquitted of the criminal charges." Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
In fact, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), recognized that a lower 
standard of proof is used in parole-revocation hearings, but the Court neither approved 
nor disapproved of that difference: "Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is 
accused of another crime: it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the proce-
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court of appeals held that the state was not collaterally estopped 
from relitigating the identity issue in the revocation hearing. 14 
Therefore, it reversed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. 10 
Standlee may or may not have been guilty of the crimes 
charged. The trial court was not convinced by the state's evi-
dence.16 But because the state's initial failure of proof was not 
conclusive, Standlee could be returned to prison to serve an addi-
tional fifteen years. This Note submits that that result is uncon-
scionable. 
The possibility of a criminal acquittal followed by revocation 
of parole on the same charges is symptomatic of the disparity 
between the due process rights of criminal defendants and those 
of parolees facing revocation. Parole is revoked in civil proceed-
ings conducted before an administrative agency, the Parole 
Commission. The Supreme Court has said that such a hearing is 
not part of a criminal prosecution and, accordingly, that the full 
panoply of criminal-procedure safeguards does not apply to it. 17 
Indeed, before the 1972 decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 18 it 
was commonly felt that a parolee need have no procedural protec-
tions.19 Justifications for this view20 derived from the idea that the 
dural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." 
408 U.S. at 479. 
14. The difference in the burdens of proof in criminal and civil proceedings 
usually precludes application of collateral estoppel. . . • Because of this difference 
in the burdens of proof an adjudication of the issues in a criminal case "does not 
constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable 
in civil proceedings." 
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut 
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1971)). 
15. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977). 
16. See text at note 2 supra. 
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
18. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
19. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), reud., 408 U.S. 
471 (1972); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Eason 
v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968); Rose v. Haskins, 
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 
505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866 (1967); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Johnson v. Tinsley, 234 F. Supp. 866 (D. Colo.), affd., 
337 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1964). 
20. The theories, all of which were implicitly rejected by the Court in Morrissey as a 
basis for denying due process to parolees, have been variously classified by the courts and 
commentators. Essentially, there are four main justifications for denying due process 
protection in parole-revocation proceedings: 
a)The Right-Priuilege Distinction: Since parole is an act of grace conferred at the 
discretion of the state, and since the parolee has no right to his conditional liberty, no 
due proess protection need be afforded him if the state decides to terminate the liberty. 
b)Contract Theory: Since the state grants parole at its option, it may contractually 
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grant of parole is an "act of grace" by the state,21 that having 
magnanimously conferred parole, the state may freely terminate 
it. On that reasoning, due process is not implicated. -
The Court has now recognized that "the [parolee's] liberty · 
is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.''22 But due process, "unlike some legal 
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances."23 Rather, it is flexible. and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.24 
In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed 
in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing 
•revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed 
parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be 
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evi-
dence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allow-
ing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing 
body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; 
and (f) to be given a written statement by the fact-finders of the 
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.25 A subse-
quent case added the right to appointed counsel if the hearing 
body finds that the parolee asserts a "colorable claim" of inno-
cence.28 
impose any conditions it desires, including the condition that parole may be revoked 
summarily at the discretion of the state. 
c)Constructive Custody: Parole merely extends the prison walls, and since the pa-
rolee is still in the custody of the Attorney General, he has no true liberty to lose. He is 
therefore entitled to no due process protection. 
d)The Civil-Criminal Distinction: Since the parolee was validly convicted at the 
original criminal proceeding, and since punishment was properly imposed, the decision 
to revoke parole is merely an administrative determination by the state to substitute one 
form of punishment for another, a civil proceeding to which no due process rights attach. 
For discussion of these theories see Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State 
Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. CoLO. L. REv. 197, 206-15 (1970); Comment, The 
Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 286-95 (1971); Comment, Due Process and Revoca-
tion of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 638, 643-48 (1966); Note, Parole: A Critique 
of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 704-20 (1963). 
21. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935): "Probation or suspension of sentence 
comes as an act of grac.e to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such 
conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose." 
22. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
23. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurtet, J., concur-
ring)). 
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). 
25. 408 U.S. at 489. 
26. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). 
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This Note argues that these protections are inadequate and 
that additional protections are constitutionally required. Specifi-
cally, the procedural rights guaranteed in juvenile-delinquency 
hearings should be extended to parole revocations so that parolees 
have (a) the privilege against self-incrimination; (b) an uncondi-
tional right to counsel; and (c) the protection of the reasonable-
doubt standard of proof. 
Part II explores the origins of the parolee's due process rights. 
It first discusses Goldberg v. Kelly, 21 a welfare-termination case 
in which the Court recognized the concept of statutory entitle-
ment-the concept that governmental largesse is a form of prop-
erty which cannot be taken without due process. This Note then 
argues that in Morrissey v. Brewer, 28 the Court implicitly equated 
the interests at stake in parole-revocation and welfare-termi-
nation proceedings and that it therefore applied Goldberg's 
welfare model of procedures to parole revocation. 
The Note next compares the parolee's interest with the wel-
fare recipient's and discovers two important differences. First, 
the parolee's liberty does not depend on statutory entitlement but 
upon his continued observance of parole conditions-while condi-
tional, his liberty is akin to that of the ordinary citizen, rather 
than to governmental largesse. Second, the potential conse-
quences of parole revocation are far more onerous than those of 
welfare termination. These differences, it is argued, make the 
parolee's interest in an accurate decision more important than 
the welfare recipient's and require greater protection than the 
Goldberg procedures afford. Part II recognizes that the state's 
interests preclude allowing parolees full-scale criminal rights 
and therefore proposes a model of due process intermediate 
between Morrissey and the criminal model. 
Part ill finds such a model in the procedures of juvenile-
delinquency hearings. That Part traces the development of proce-
dural protections for juveniles from the early days, when due 
process was thought not to apply; through the creation of mini-
mum due process rights in In re Gault;29 to the recognition in In 
re Winship30 that the transcendent value of the liberty at stake 
makes the juvenile proceeding sufficiently similar to a criminal 
prosecution that the protection of the reasonable-doubt standard 
is necessary. Part ill details the procedures mandated in the juve-
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
28. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
29. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
30. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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nile cases and argues that the difference between those proce-
dures and parole-revocation procedures stem from the Court's 
implicit belief that while the juvenile's liberty is like that of the 
ordinary citizen, the parolee's is governmental largesse and so less 
deserving of protection. 
Part IV examines that implicit belief by analyzing the inter-
ests at stake in the two proceedings. The Part first compares the 
parolee's and the juvenile's interests and finds them constitution-
ally indistinguishable. The parolee's interest, lik~ the juvenile's, 
is liberty. Neither the greater restrictions on nor the conditional 
nature of the parolee's liberty distinguishes it from the juvenile's, 
and the effect of an erroneous decision to revoke parole is as great 
as that of an erroneous adjudication of delinquency. The Note 
next examines the remaining justification for the different levels 
of due process protection in parole and juvenile proceed-
ings-that because the state need not grant parole, the parolee's 
liberty is a "privilege" entitled to less protection than the liberty 
of the juvenile-and finds it merely a tautology. In short, Part IV 
contends that the kinds of interests which necessitate the addi-
tional rights afforded to juveniles are equally present j.n parole 
revocation. 
Part IV concludes by examining the government's interests 
and showing that extending juvenile rights to parolees comports 
with those interests. Such extension would promote the state's 
interest in accurate decisions by assuring that confessions are 
trustworthy, that defenses are adequately developed and pre-
sented, and that the possibility of an erroneous decision is re-
duced to an acceptable level. Furthermore, the state's interests 
in saving money and keeping proceedings simple are not affected 
by the privilege against self-incrimination or the reasonable-
doubt standard and are only slightly more compromised by an 
absolute right to counsel than by the "colorable claim" procedure 
now used. In sum, the Note concludes, due process requires the 
same level of protection for the parolee as for the juvenile. 
Il. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR PAROLEES 
A. Due Process and the Deprivation of Property 
This subpart argues that the Court in Morrissey drew from 
its earlier decision in Goldberg both a rationale for applying due 
process to parole revocation and a model of specific rights. The 
Goldberg Court recognized that due process is required to protect 
the welfare recipient's statutory property and constructed a 
126 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:120 
model of rights appropriate to the interest at stake. In doing so, 
the Court relied on the concept of statutory entitlement, a con-
cept born of Charles Reich's 1964 article, The New Property. 31 
Although some of the Court's recent decisions may have discred-
ited Professor Reich's notion of largesse as property, 32 it is central 
to an understanding of the property basis for the Goldberg rights, 
which ultimately became the Morrissey rights. 
l. The Welfare Model of Procedural Safeguards 
In his article, Charles Reich urged the re-evaluation of the 
theories according to which governmental largesse is regulated. 
Society, said Reich, developed the idea of "property" to provide 
individuals the means to act independently.33 Property creates a 
zone of private power within which the majority's preferences 
must yield to those of the owner. Upon this power political rights 
and civil liberties depend.34 But in the public-interest state,35 gov-
ernmental largesse has begun to supplement traditional private 
property as an important form of wealth.36 Such largesse origi-
nates with the state and can be denied or taken away to serve 
some legitimate public policy.37 The potential for arbitrary depri-
vation, Reich argued, raises the spectre of increasing governmen-
tal intrusion into the affairs of the individual, 38 who is decreas-
ingly protected by private property. Therefore, said Reich, we 
need a new zone of privacy around governmental largesse39 so that 
it can do the work of property. Those forms of largesse closely 
linked to individual well-being and status must be held as of 
right.40 In short, they must become a new form of property which 
cannot be taken away without due process of law.41 
In Goldberg v. Kelly42 the Supreme Court, citing Professor 
Reich, recognized that welfare benefits are such a new form of 
property,43 that they are statutory entitlements of qualified recip-
31. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
32. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due 
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 469-70 (1977). 
33. Reich, supra note 31, at 771-72. 
34. Id. at 771. 
35. See id. at 756-71. 
36. See id. at 738-39. 
37. Id. at 774. 
38. Id. at 764. 
39. See id. at 785-86. 
40. Id. at 785. 
41. See id. at 783-85. 
42. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
43. "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'proper~y• 
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ients44 and cannot be terminated without procedural guarantees 
against arbitrary decisions. Specifically, due process requires a 
pre-termination evidentiary hearing to resolve the question of 
entitlement. 
In Goldberg, the Court at the outset rejected the argument 
that because welfare benefits are a privilege, due process is not 
implicated.45 Whether due process is required depends on the 
equities of the case rather than on the label applied to the interest 
of the individual. 46 
Second, the Court balanced the competing interests of the 
recipient and the state to gauge whether the recipient is constitu-
tionally entitled to procedural safeguards when the state decides 
to terminate welfare.47 On one hand is the recipient's interest in 
continuing to receive welfare. Without benefits, truly eligible re-
cipients-those lacking independent resources-would need to 
concentrate upon securing their daily subsistence and would have 
neither the time nor money to seek redress from the welfare bu-
reaucracy. 48 Furthermore, the state is interested in preventing an 
erroneous termination of benefits-public assistance promotes 
the general welfare by fostering the dignity and well-being of all 
persons, and these purposes are best served by the uninterrupted 
provision of benefits to eligible recipients.49 
On the other hand, the state is interested in the funds saved 
by summary terminations.50 Under the state's pre-Goldberg sys-
tem, payments could be stopped promptly if the state had reason-
able grounds to believe the recipient ineligible; few recipients 
requested the post-termination hearing authorized by statute. 
than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that 
do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property." 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. That 
footnote goes on to quote Reich's 1965 article, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The 
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965), to the effect that entitlements "are 
no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients, they are essentials. fully 
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity." The footnote concludes by citing Reich's 
earlier article, The New Property, supra note 31. 
44. 397 U.S. at 262. 
45. 397 U.S. at 262. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
46. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969): "This constitutional 
challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a 
'privilege' and not a 'right.'" See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) 
(unemployment compensation); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (social security 
benefits); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (termination of em-
ployment). 
47. 397 U.S. at 266. 
48. 397 U.S. at 264. 
49. 397 U.S. at 264-65. 
50. 397 U.S. at 265. 
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Pre-termination hearings, the state argued, would be burdensome 
and expensive. 51 
The Court found the interests favoring due process protec-
tion weightier: 
As the District Court correctly concluded, "[t]he stakes are 
simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for 
honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termina-
tion of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, 
to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest 
its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal."a2 
Third, the Court specified the procedures required. Balanc-
ing the need for a preliminary determination of eligibilty against 
the costs of one to the state, the Court concluded that a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing is necessary. 53 The Court held 
that the recipient must receive advance notification of the state's 
case for termination and that he must have an opportunity to 
appear at the evidentiary hearing, to be represented by retained 
counsel, 54 and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
If benefits are terminated, the recipient must receive a written 
explanation of that decision. 55 
Goldberg is significant in three respects. First, its rejection 
of the right-privilege shibboleth means that whether procedural 
safeguards are required depends upon a decision's impact on pri-
vate interests rather than on a characterization of those interests 
as rights or privileges. Second, and equally important, the Court 
recognized a limited property interest in important governmental 
benefits: If the state elects by statute to grant a benefit, it be-
comes a statutory entitlement of qualified recipients58 which can-
not be taken away without due process of law. Third, the pattern 
of due process protection established in Goldberg was adapted for 
parolees in Morrissey. 
2. The Welfare Model Applied to Parole Revocation 
Morrissey v. Brewer 57 applied due process to parole revoca-
51. 397 U.S. at 265. 
52. 397 U.S. at 266 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968)). 
53. 397 U.S. at 264. 
54. The Court made no provision for appointed counsel. 397 U.S. at 270-71. Compare 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), where the Court recognized the need for ap• 
pointed counsel where a parolee or probationer asserts a colorable claim of innocence. 
55. 397 U.S. at 266-71. 
56. 397 U.S. at 262. 
57. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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tion. Morrissey and his co-petitioner, Booher, were Iowa parolees 
who had been summarily reincarcerated on the recommendations 
of their parole officers. 58 Each unsuccessfully sought a writ of 
habeas corpus in the district court, 59 arguing by analogy to 
Goldberg that the state's failure to hold a pre-incarceration hear-
ing had denied him due process in violation of the fourteenth 
amendment. The dismissals of the writs were affirmed by the 
court of appeals,60 which found the due process clause inapplica-
ble to the decision to revoke parole. The Supreme Court re-
versed. 61 Due process, said the Court, requi-res a preincarceration 
hearing at which evidence can be presented and charges can be 
substantiated or rebutted. 
First, the Court rejected the argument that because parole 
is a "privilege," revocation is wholly discretionary. Chief Justice 
Burger quoted from Graham v. Richardson:62 "[T]his Court now 
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon 
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as 
a 'privilege.' "63 Instead, "[ w]hether any procedural protections 
are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be 
'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' " 64 In short: "The question is 
not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether 
the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 
58. Morrissey pleaded guilty in 1967 to a charge of passing bad check; and was 
sentenced to not more than seven years' imprisonment. He was paroled in June 1968. 
Seven months later, he was arrested at the direction of his parole officer and incarcerated 
in the county jail. A week later, the Iowa Board of Parole revoked his parole on the strength 
of the parole officer's written report, which charged him with: purchasing a car under an 
assumed name and operating it without permission; giving false statements to police 
concerning his address and insurance company after a minor accident; obtaining credit 
under an assumed name; and failing to report his place of residence to the parole officer. 
Booher pleaded guilty in 1966 to charges of forgery and was sentenced to not more 
than 10 years in prison. He was paroled in November 1968. In August 1969, he was arrested 
as a parole violator, and in September of that year, his parole was, on the written report 
of his parole officer, summarily revoked. The charges were that he had violated the 
territorial restrictions of his parole without authorization, obtained a driver's license under 
an assumed name, operated a motor vehicle without permission, and failed to keep himself 
gainfully employed. 408 U.S. at 472-74. 
59. The court denied the writ on April 15, 1970, in Morrissey's case and on June 16, 
1970, in Booher's case. Neither decision was reported. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 
942, 944 (8th Cir. 1971). 
60. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971). The cases were consolidated 
for appeal. 
61. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
62. 403 U.S. 365,-374 (1971). 
63. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
64. 408 U.S. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment. "0• 
Second, in deciding whether the parolee's interest is within 
the contemplation of that language, the Court evaluated the po-
tential loss to the p~olee facing revocation. The interest at stake, 
the Court reasoned, is the parolee's conditional liberty, which 
enables him to hold a job, to be with his family, and to lead a 
relatively normal life. Although that liberty is indeterminate and 
restricted, it is valuable, and terminating it inflicts a grievous 
loss. Although conditional, it is sufficiently akin to unqualified 
liberty that it falls within the "liberty or property" language of 
the fourteenth amendment.88 The state thus may not abridge it 
without due process of law.87 
Third, in deciding which procedures are necessary, the Court 
balanced the competing interests of the parolee and the state.08 
On one hand is th_e parolee's interest in continuing his conditional 
liberty. Reincarceration not only disrupts his family and employ-
ment, it also interferes with his ability to show he did not violate 
his parole. Further, the parolee relies on the state's implicit prom-
ise that it will not revoke parole in the absence of a violation. 69 
.Finally, the state itself has an interest in not revoking parole if 
parole is adequately serving its corrective function and an interest 
in not embittering parolees by treating them arbitrarily.70 
On the other hand, the state must prevent antisocial con-
duct. The Court recognized that, since parolees have been pre-
viously convicted and since some cannot live in society without 
committing additional crimes, the state has an "overwhelming"71 
interest in being able to imprison actual parole violators without 
the burden of a new criminal trial. 72 
The Court found the interests favoring a pre-incarceration 
hearing controlling: because incarceration so completely disrupts 
his life, the parolee cannot be locked up solely on the recommen-
dation of his parole officer. Yet logistical problems may preclude 
a full-scale evidentiary hearing at the time and place of the al-
leged violation, and the state cannot permit suspected parole 
violators to remain at large until such a hearing can be con-
ducted. The Court's solution was dual hearings. 
65. 408 U.S. at 481. See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
66. 408 U.S. at 481. 
67. 408 U.S. at 482. 
68. 408 U.S. at 483-84. 
69. 408 U.S. at 482. 
70. 408 U.S. at 484. 
71. 408 U.S. at 483. 
72. 408 U.S. at 483. 
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The first hearing simply determines whether there is proba-
ble cause to believe that the individual has violated parole.73 The 
hearing must be conducted by a parole officer not directly in-
volved in the case; it must be at or reasonably near the place of 
the alleged violation and as soon as possible after the arrest. 74 The 
parolee must be notified before the hearing of the charges against 
him, permitted to appear at the hearing and to present evidence 
in his behalf, and allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the fact-finder determines that this would jeop-
ardize their safety). If probable cause is found, the parolee must 
be given a written summary of the evidence which led to that 
decision.75 
These procedures reflect the influence of Goldberg, which the 
Court cited several times.76 The pre-incarceration hearing is a 
direct extension of Goldberg's pre-termination hearing. The re-
quirements of a neutral trier of fact; of advance notice; of an 
opportunity to appear, to present evidence, and to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses; and of a written explanation of 
the decision were transplanted from the welfare-termination 
hearing~ The only difference is that the Morrissey Court did not 
say whether a parolee has a right to retain counsel to represent 
him at the parole hearing~the Court found it unnecessary to 
decide that question.77 
73. 408 U.S. at 485. 
74. Arrest sometimes involves incarceration in an institution distant from the place 
of the alleged violation. It will be difficult for the parolee to rebut even spurious a!legations 
if so confined. Furthermore, since there is often a substantial time lag between arrest of 
the parolee and revocation of parole, 408 U.S. at 485, exculpatory evidence can disappear 
in the intervening period. And even if ultimately exonerated, the parolee can lose employ-
ment and thus suffer financial hardship by the mere fact of incarceration: 
Because a new period of incarceration, even if only 24 hours in length, may cost 
a parolee his employment, and further jeopardize his chances for rehabilitation, the 
detention of an alleged violator is a serious matter and must be dealt with in a 
manner which clearly recognizes the degree of loss to be suffered. 
S. REP. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) (referring to the then-pending Parole 
Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18 (1976)). 
75. 408 U.S. at 485-87. 
76. 408 U.S. at 485-87. 
77. 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the'Court extended 
to probation-revocation proceedings the due process rights established in Morrissey. 
Gagnon imposed the additional requirement that the indigent parolee or probationer who 
asserts a colorable claim of innocence have appointed counsel. The applicability of the 
right was to be determined by the Parole Commission case by case. The Court was not 
presented with the question whether a parolee with independent resources was entitled 
to retained co.unsel. 
Congress felt that the right to retained counsel should be recognized as well. In the 
Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1976), it provided 
that in hearings held pursuant to that section there shall be "opportunity for the parolee 
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Yet the Court recognized that a hearing which simply finds 
probable cause to believe a parolee violated his parole is not due 
process. Such a hearing answers only the first of three separate 
questions: whether there is enough evidence to justify incarcerat-
ing the parolee pending a full-scale evidentiary hearing; if so, 
whether the evidence presented at the revocation hearing justifies 
the conclusion that the individual violated his parole; and finally, 
whether parole should be revoked.78 The discretionary decision to 
revoke parole can be made only after a finding of a violation79 and 
only by the federal Parole Commission80 or the equivalent state 
authority. Thus, a preliminary hearing alone would not provide 
due process. 81 
The Court therefore mandated an opportunity for the parolee 
to have, upon request, a second hearing before the final decision 
to revoke parole.82 This must be a full-scale hearing at which 
contested facts are finally resolved and at which the Parole Com-
mission decides what sanctions are appropriate. Its procedures 
again reflect the Goldberg model: the parolee is entitled to writ-
ten notice of the alleged violations; he must be informed prior to 
the hearing of the evidence against him; and he must be permit-
ted to appear, to present evidence and witnesses in his defense, 
and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (subject to 
limitations to protect their safety). Finally, he must be told in 
writing the reasons for an adverse decision.83 
The Morrissey decision is important for two reasons. First, 
the Court established that, despite its conditional nature, the 
parolee's liberty interest is within the protection of the "liberty 
or property" language of the fourteenth amendment. The Court 
evidently reasoned that, like the property interest of the welfare 
recipient, the parolee's liberty, once granted, is a statutory enti-
.to be represented by an attorney (retained by the parolee, or if he is financially unable 
to retain counsel, counsel shall be provided)." Thus, the parolee now has a statutory right 
to retained or appointed counsel, regardless of the Commission's view of his claim of 
innocence. 
78. 408 U.S. at 479-80. 
79. 408 U.S. at 479-80, 483-84. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d) (1976). 
81. In Goldberg, New York had provided by statute that the welfare recipient could 
request a post-termination hearing at which his eligibility would be finally determined. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). Consequently, the Court was not confronted 
with the question whether due process required a post-termination hearing. But given the 
Court's emphasis on welfare as an entitlement, 397 U.S. at 262, it seems clear that, in 
the absence of the statutory hearing, the Court would have mandated a post-termination 
hearing, just as it did in Morrissey. 
82. 408 U.S. at 489. 
83. 408 U.S. at 489. 
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tlement. A decision to terminate either welfare or parole directly 
affects an important private interest, and it is immaterial that 
that interest could be characterized as a privilege. Goldberg had 
established that, however characterized, the property interest of 
the welfare recipient is entitled to due process protection. Since 
Morrissey in effect analogized the liberty interest of the parolee 
to the property interest of the welfare recipient, 84 the application 
of due process to parole revocation followed logically. 
Second, the extent to which the Morrissey Court drew upon 
Goldberg in formulating procedural safeguards for parole revoca-
tion indicates that the Court thought the parolee's interest nearly 
identical to that of the welfare recipient. Goldbt;!rg recognized 
that the recipient has a property interest in welfare benefits. 
Morrissey recognized that the parolee has a liberty interest in 
parole. By adopting the Goldberg model of procedure, the 
Morrissey Court in effect equated the two kinds of interests. 
There are undeniably similarities between welfare termina-
tions and parole revocations. In each case, the state seeks to 
terminate what may be viewed as a governmental benefit it was 
never required to confer. The individual in each proceeding has 
an interest in retaining that benefit if he is entitled to do so. The 
purpose of due process in each situation is to ensure that the 
question of entitlement is accurately resolved. 
Because the Court accepted these similarities and did not 
investigate the dissimilarities85 between the proceedings, the 
Court saw no reason to go beyond the Goldberg procedures.86 
Thus, saying that its imposition of a due process requirement was 
not intended to equate a revocation hearing to a criminal prosecu-
tion, 87 the Court made no provision for appointed counsel or for 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Further, the 
84. 408 U.S. at 493, 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Although the majority 
opinion does not explicitly cite Goldberg as precedent for the requirement of due process, 
the opinion as a whole supports the analogy. E.g., 408 U.S. at 481 (Goldberg recognized 
that application of due process turns on whether the governmental action inflicts a 
"grievous loss"); 408 U.S. at 482 (termination of parole inflicts a "grievous loss"). See also 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974), where the Court likened the prisoner's 
liberty interest in retaining his "good time" credits to a property interest: "This analysis 
as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property .... We think a 
person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of 
the State." 
85. See text at notes 90-96 infra. 
86. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 486 (since Goldberg did not require a judicial pre-
termination hearing to protect the welfare recipient's interest, none is required to protect 
the parolee's interest). 
87. "We emphasize that there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole 
revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense." 408 U.S. at 489. 
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Court said that rules of evidence should be relaxed to permit 
consideration of material not admissible in a criminal trial.88 Fi-
nally, the Court noted that proof beyond a reasonable doubt has 
not been required.89 In sum, the Court transplanted the model of 
procedural safeguards developed for welfare terminations into the 
parole-revocation context, but it did not give complete attention 
to whether the situations of the welfare recipient and the parolee 
are substantially similar. 
B. Due Process and the Deprivation of Liberty: 
Problems with the Goldberg Analogy 
This subpart argues that, while Morrissey correctly recog-
nized that the liberty interest of the parolee is entitled to due 
process protection, the Court erred in equating the iµterests of the 
parolee and the welfare recipient. The Note here points out two 
distinctions: first, the parolee's interest-liberty-is different in 
nature from the welfare recipient's property interest and thus is 
more than a statutory entitlement; second, because the conse-
quences of parole revocation are more severe, that proceeding 
jeopardizes the individual's interest to a greater extent than does 
a welfare-termination proceeding. These differences make the 
parolee's liberty interest, quite simply, more important than the 
welfare recipient's property interest and demand a level of protec-
tion not afforded by the Goldberg procedures. 
The initial problem with the Goldberg analogy is that the 
interests of the parolee and welfare recipient are different in na-
ture. The welfare recipient's "property" depends entirely upon 
statutory entitlement.90 To assure a minimum standard of living, 
the state provides welfare benefits to qualified recipients who, in 
turn, depend upon those benefits for support. If the state may 
terminate benefits arbitrarily, it will have gained a source of 
power over recipients.st Consequently, the Goldberg Court found 
it necessary to provide mechanisms for deciding whether a termi-
nation of benefits is justified. 92 The result was the concept of 
statutory entitlement: so long as the state continues to make the 
benefit available, an individual who meets the statutory criteria 
is entitled to continue to receive it. 
88. 408 U.S. at 489. 
89. 408 U.S. at 479. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1973). 
90. "Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to 
receive them." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). 
91. See Reich, supra note 31, at 749-51. 
92. See text at note 52 supra. 
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But statutory entitlement implies the ongoing provision of 
consumable benefits. 93 A recipient's "property" consists only of 
the right to demand that his eligibility be determined according 
to objective statutory criteria. If the state elected to cease provid-
ing welfare entirely, the recipient would have no property interest 
in welfare benefits. 
By contrast, the liberty of the parolee does not depend upon 
the concept of statutory entitlement. While parole certainly bene-
fits the parolee, it is a nonconsumable benefit which is granted 
once and then either retained or revoked. This stems from the fact 
that release on parole removes restrictions formerly imposed 
through confinement. Furthermore, once he is paroled, an indi-
vidual's rights cannot be affected by the state's decision to cease 
granting parole, for by paroling him, the state has implicitly 
promised t4e parolee that, as long as he abides by the conditions 
of his release, he will not be reincarcerated.94 Thus, the parolee's 
liberty interest depends neither upon his continued eligibility for 
a benefit-he has already received it-nor upon the state's con-
tinued provision of similar benefits, but only upon his compliance 
with conditions established at the time of his release. This is 
entitlement only in its negative sense: if he ceases to qualify by 
violating parole, the previously conferred 1Jenefit may be taken 
away. But entitlement in this negative sense also describes the 
right of the ordinary citizen to retain his liberty as long as he 
observes the law. The parolee's liberty is thus very different from 
the "property" of the welfare recipient. 
A second important difference between the welfare-
termination and parole-revocation hearings lies in the decision's 
effect on the personal interests at stake. The welfare-termination 
hearing resolves the question of the current entitlement of the 
individual to receive benefits, and a determination of ineligibility 
implies nothing as to future eligibility. The consequences of an 
erroneous decision, therefore, may be only temporary. By con-
trast, the central issue in a parole-revocation proceeding is 
whether the parolee has violated his parole. The consequences of 
the decision may be far-~eaching: an erroneous revocation can 
cause the incarceration of the parolee for many years. 95 Snch a 
93. If benefits were not consumable, the recipient would have no need for additional 
benefits in the future. 
94. "Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the 
parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions 
of his parole." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). 
95. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 480 (1972). 
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potential result makes the proceeding comparable in seriousness 
to a felony prosecution.96 The parole-revocation hearing thus not 
only deals with a more significant personal interest than a 
welfare-termination proceeding,97 it threatens that interest more 
profoundly. 
Nevertheless, the Court held in Morrissey that the parolee is 
not entitled to all the criminal-procedure protections. 98 The Court 
noted that parole-revocation proceedings are conducted by an 
administrative agency which finds facts and exercises discretion 
and that the state's interest in avoiding overly formal proce-
dures99 makes some criminal-procedure safeguards inappropriate. 
Jury trials, for example, would be burdensome and expensive. 
Strict rules of evidence might impair the Parole Commission's 
ability to evaluate all the circumstances of the parolee's conduct 
in predicting the likelihood of future violations. 100 While the 
96. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) ("a proceeding where the issue is whether a 
child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for many years 
is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution"). 
97. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). 
98. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
99. Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the 
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able to 
live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. Given the previous 
conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the St.ate has an overwhelming 
interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden 
of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions 
of his parole. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). . 
But that reasoning begs the question. The purpose of due process is to assure fair and 
objective decisions. If it could be known in advance that the parolee had ignored the 
conditions of his parole, the only remaining question would be whether to revoke parole, 
a decision wholly within the parole authority's discretion. See text at notes 78,80, ,qupra. 
Due process would require only that the parolee be allowed to explain any mitigating 
circumstances. See 408 U.S. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). But the hearing must 
first determine whether a violation was committed. 408 U.S. at 479. Procedural safeguards 
are designed to insure that that determination is correct. To begin with the assumption 
that a violation has occured is to assume the answer that due process is designed to 
facilitate. 
It is not, however, the purpose of this Note to advocate that the full range of criminal-
procedure safeguards be applied to parole-revocation proceedings. Although there is no 
logical reason such safeguards should not be made available to parolees, so radical a 
departure from current practice must, practically speaking, await a corresponding change 
in juvenile justice; and although procedural safeguards for juveniles are more palatable 
than they would be for parolees, the Court has so far refused to apply the criminal model 
to juvenile-delinquency hearings. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,540 (1971), 
discussed in note 134 infra. 
100. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (disposition requires applica• 
tion of expertise in predicting the ability of the parolee to Jive in society without commit-
ting future antisocial acts); 408 U.S. at 489 ("process should be flexible enough to consider 
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in 
an adversary criminal trial"). 
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parolee's liberty interest requires that the state compromise to 
some extent its interest in fiscal savings and administrative con-
venience, it does not, the Court decided, justify full-scale crimi-
nal proceedings. 
This Note argues that the Court improperly struck the bal-
ance between the parolee's interests and the state's. Greater pro-
cedural safeguards are required because liberty is at stake and 
because of the serious consequences of revoking parole. What is 
needed, then, are procedures intermediate between Morrissey 
and the criminal-trial model. Such a model would retain the 
flexibility to allow thorough review by the decision-maker of all 
pertinent evidence. It would allow the individual to remain silent 
without risking adverse inferences. It would assure the parolee 
adequate assistance in preparing and presenting a defense. And 
most important, it would recognize an adverse decision's devas-
tating impact on the parolee by requiring that the trier of fact be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the parolee's guilt. Such 
a model is provided by the procedures of juvenile-delinquency 
hearings. 
III. THE JUVENILE-DELINQUENCY MODEL OF PROCEDURAL 
SAFEGU~DS 
The situations of the juvenile and the parolee in their respec-
tive hearings are sufficiently analogous that the juvenile and the 
parolee should receive the same degree of procedural protection. 
Some of the features of the analogy are readily apparent. Both the 
juvenile-delinquency hearing and the parole-revocation proceed-
ing historically were regarded as exercises of administrative dis-
cretion to which due process did not apply .101 Even today, neither 
proceeding is considered a criminal prosecution, and some 
criminal-procedure safeguards are inapplicable.102 Yet despite 
these similarities, the Court guaranteed juveniles rights parolees 
do not have: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
counsel, and the protection of the reasonable-doubt standard. 
As the groundwork for a criticism of the Court's failure to 
employ the analogy, this Part details the development of juvenile 
procedures. The Part argues that the Court granted greater rights 
to juveniles than to parolees because it thought the delinquency 
hearing more closely resembles a criminal trial than a welfare 
101. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). 
102. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 
U.S. 528, 540 (1971). See text at note 134 infra. 
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termination. That distinction arose from the Court's assumption 
that the parolee's interest is different from and less important 
than the juvenile's. 
In re Gault1°3 established that due process is constitutionally 
required in juvenile-delinquency proceedings. Gault was accused 
of making an obscene telephone call to a neighbor, an offense that 
was a misdemeanor when committed by an adult. 104 Two hearings 
were conducted within a week of the arrest. Although Gault and 
his parents were permitted to attend, no other procedural safe-
guards were provided. 105 Gault, then fifteen, was adjudged a de-
linquent child and committed to a juvenile training school until 
the age of twenty-one. Arizona law permitted no appeal from that 
decision,.108 and the state courts denied his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 107 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the hearing's procedural safeguards had been inade-
quate to secure fourteenth amendment due process. 108 
The Court first 'reviewed the development of the delinquency 
proceeding as an alternative to punishing juveniles in appalling 
adult corrections systems.109 Arizona had made the traditional 
argument that juvenile proceedings are essentially administrative 
hearings in which the state acts as parens patriae110 and is inter-
103. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
104. Under the former Arizona Juvenile Code, 1941 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 80, § 2 
(repealed 1970), a delinquent child was defined as a child who had committed an act 
which constituted an offense against any law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of 
a political subdivision thereof. 
105. No sworn testimony was taken at either proceeding, and the evidence of Gault's 
delinquency came llntirely from statements of the arresting officer. The delinquency peti-
tion was not made available to Gault or his family until the habeas corpus proceeding over 
two months later. At neither proceeding was the complainant present, and in fact she was 
interviewed only once, by telephone, when the complaint was received. No transcript was 
made of either proceeding, and the events of the hearings emerged only from testimony 
at the habeas corpus proceeding. 387 U.S. at 4-8. 
106. 387 U.S. at 8. 
107. In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). The initial denial of the writ was 
unreported. 
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
109. 387 U.S. at 15. 
110. The Latin phrase [has] proved to be a great help to those who sought to 
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its mean-
ing is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was 
taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of · 
the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests 
and the person of the child. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, -16 (1967). As applied to the juvenile proceeding, the phrase was 
apparently intended to mean that when the state sought an adjudication of delinquency 
and appropriate "remedial" sanctions, it acted in the interest of the child rather than as 
its adversary. Since the hearing was not an adversary proceeding, due process was thought 
unnecessary. 
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ested in treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment. 111 
But since the state's interest, however great, does not justify a 
total denial of due process if the individual's interest is within the 
"liberty or property" language of the due process clause, the 
Court rejected the parens patriae argument as a rational basis for 
denial of due process protection. 112 
The Court then analyzed the differences between criminal 
and juvenile proceedings involving the same conduct. 113 It noted 
that Gault's offense, if committed by an adult, would have been 
a misdemeanor punishable by no more than two months' confine-
ment. Gault's sentence was six years. An adult faced with a po-
tential sentence of that length would have had the full range of 
criminal-procedure safeguards. Gault had not even been permit-
ted counsel. Said the Court, "So wide a gulf between the State's 
treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier 
The state's role in parole-revocation proceedings has also been characterized as that 
of parens patriae: "In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole occupies the role 
of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as punishment but for misuse 
of the privilege." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 957 
(1963). 
111. "The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from 
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). See also In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 197, 247 
N.E.2d 253, 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1969), revd. sub nom. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. Ar:r §§ 763, 766-68, 760 (McKinney 1976) (upon an· 
adjudication of delinquency, the court may suspend judgment, place the child in private 
custody, impose probation, or commit the child to a juvenile detention center or to the 
Department of Mental Hygiene). 
112. 387 U.S. at 30. 
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an 
individual will be "'condemned to suffer grievous loss." •.. The question is not 
merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether it is one within the 
contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). If the individual's interest meets these tests, 
due process applies. The state's interest is relevant only in determining what procedures 
are required. 408 U.S. at 481. 
113. If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile 
Court proceedings. For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum 
punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not 
more than 2 months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six 
years. If he had been over 18 and had committed an offense to which such a 
sentence might apply, he would have been entitled to substantial rights under the 
Constitution. . .. It would assure him of specific notice of the charges and ade-
quate time to decide his course of action and to prepare his defense. He would be 
entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by counsel, and, at least if a 
felony were involved, the f3tate would be required to provide counsel if his parents 
were unable to afford it. If the court acted on the basis of his confession, careful 
procedures would be required to assure its voluntariness. If the case went to trial, 
confrontation and opportunity for cross-examination would be guaranteed. 
387 U.S. at 29. 
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than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than mere 
cliche can provide."114 
The Court therefore held that when the state seeks an adjudi-
cation of delinquency, it must provide these procedural safe-
guards: notice of charges; the right to counsel, either retained or 
appointed; the privilege against self-incrimination; and the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 115 
Three years later, in In re Winship, 116 the Court required 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile-delinquency 
proceedings. Winship had been accused of theft. 117 He had had 
the procedural safeguards mandated by Gault but was found 
guilty because state law required proof by only a preponderance 
of the evidence. 118 The juvenile judge said that the evidence had 
not persuaded him beyond a reasonable doubt of Winship's guilt 
but that the state had satisfied the lesser burden of proof. Win-
ship was therefore adjudged a juvenile delinquent. 119 The New 
York Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard denied him due process, 120 
but, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 
The New York courts had held that, because the juvenile 
proceeding was civil rather than criminal 121 and was designed to 
save the child rather than to punish him, 122 the reasonable-doubt 
standard was inappropriate. 123 Quoting Gault, the Court contro-
verted that reasoning: 
We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good 
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due 
process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where 
the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and 
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seri-
ousness to a felony prosecution."124 
114. 387 U.S. at 29-30. 
115. 387 U.S. at 31-57. 
116. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
117. N.Y. FA?.1. CT. Ar:r § 712 (McKinney 1954) defined a juvenile delinquent as "a 
person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by 
an adult, would constitute a crime." Winship, then 12, was found guilty of having entered 
a locker and taken $112 from a woman's purse. His initial sentence of 18 months in the 
juvenile detention center was subject to annual renewal until he reached the age of 18. 
397 U.S. at 360. 
118. N.Y. FAM. CT. Ar:r. § 744(b) (McKinney 1954). 
119. 397 U.S. at 360. 
120. In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), a/fg. 
W. v. Family Court, 30 App. Div. 2d 781, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1968). 
121. 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420. 
122. 24 N.Y.2d at 197, 247 N.E.2d at 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 415. 
123. 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420. 
124. 397 U.S. at 365-66 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)). 
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The Court also rejected the state's argument that requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt might destroy many of the bene-
ficial aspects of the juvenile proceeding:125 
Nor will there be any effect on the informality, flexibility, or 
speed of the hearing at which the fact finding takes place. And the 
opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing 
for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his 
individualized treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there 
will be no effect on the procedures distinctive to juvenile proceed-
ings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing.126 
The Court then evaluated the reasonable-doubt standard in 
terms of the possibility of an erroneous finding of guilt. The 
Court's concern was with those cases such as Winship in which 
there was some doubt as to the guilt of the accused. As Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion stated, the outcome of those mar-
ginal cases, in which there is a manifest potential for error, must 
reflect society's decision whether to err in favor of freeing the 
guilty or of convicting the innocent: 
[T]he trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be 
wrong in his factual conclusions. In a lawsuit between two parties, 
a factual error can make a difference in one of two ways. First, it 
can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true facts 
warrant a judgment for the defendant. The analogue in a criminal 
case would be the conviction of an innocent man. On the other 
hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a judgment 
for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plain-
tiffs favor. The criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a 
guilty man. 
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of 
these two types of erroneous outcomes. If, for example, the stan-
dard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evi-
dence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would 
be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty per-
sons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting 
the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the compara-
tive frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice 
of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation 
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the compara-
tive social disutility of each.127 
The policy reflected by requiring the reasonable-doubt stan-
125. For example, under New York law, an adjudication of delinquency does not 
constitute conviction of a crime and therefore does not deprive the juvenile of his civil 
rights. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). 
126. 397 U.S. at 366-67. 
127. 397 U.S. at 370-71. 
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dard in juvenile proceedings grew out of the analogy with criminal 
proceedings. 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing 
error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. 
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as 
a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced 
as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden 
of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that 
no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the 
burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt. 128 
The Court implicitly recognized that the disutility of convicting 
an innocent juvenile, of depriving him of liberty and stigmatizing 
him, is greater than the disutility of freeing a guilty youth. 120 
Therefore, it held that the reasonable-doubt standard is constitu-
tionally required. 130 
Thus, in Winship the Court implicitly recognized that 
. whether the reasonable-doubt standard must be used depends 
not upon the form of the proceeding but upon the desirability in 
the particular case of avoiding erroneous adjudications of guilt. 
It seems clear that the more closely the individual's interest ap-
proximates the "transcending value" of the liberty of a criminal 
defendant, the greater is the desirability of avoiding error. 131 At 
some point, the Constitution demands that level of certitude with 
which it protects the criminal defendant: proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 
Gault and Winship established the core132 of the juvenile 
model of procedure. In addition to the rights they share with 
parolees and welfare recipients-the rights to receive advance 
notice of charges, to be heard, to present rebuttal evidence, and 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses-juveniles have 
the rights to retained or appointed counsel, the privilege against 
self-incrimination, and the reasonable-doubt standard. 
128. Speiserv. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958), quoted inln re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970). 
129. 397 U.S. at 367. 
130. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable. 
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364. 
131. One might, of course, argue that, whatever the value of an individual's interest, 
the state may have inte~ests which override any interest of the individual and justify the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The Court's language, however, considered 
only the interest of the individual and so does not seem susceptible to such an interpreta-
tion. See text at note 128 supra. 
132. Juveniles also may claim protection against double jeopardy. See note 134 infra. 
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The Court provided these additional rights because the juve-
nile's liberty is at stake in a delinquency hearing.133 Because lib-
erty, not property, is at stake, due process requires a higher level 
of protection from arbitrary decisions than the Goldberg proce-
dures alone secure. While "the juvenile court proceeding has not 
yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution' within the meaning 
and reach of the Sixth Amendment, " 134 the Court plainly thought 
that the potential for depriving the juvenile of his liberty makes 
the delinquency hearing comparable in seriousness to a criminal 
trial. t3s 
By contrast, the Court has viewed the parolee's liberty as a 
sort of statutory entitlement not achieving the magnitude of a 
true liberty interest.138 The Court has therefore assumed the pa-
rolee is not entitled to all the procedural safeguards afforded the 
juvenile: "A juvenile charged with violation of a generally applic-
able statute is differently situated from an already-convicted pro-
bationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protec-
tion."137 
IV. THE LIBERTY INTERESTS OF THE PAROLEE AND THE JUVENILE 
This Part criticizes the Court's assumption that the juve-
nile's liberty is different from and more important than the paro-
lee's. First, the Part analyzes and rejects possible distinctions 
133. However laudable its purposes, "commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is 
incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' " In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 50 (1967). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970). 
134. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court 
refused to extend the right to jury trial to juvenile proceedings. But the distinction be-
tween criminal and juvenile proceedings was narrowed in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 
(1975), where the Court held that the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause precludes 
a second proceeding based on the same charge following a juvenile proceeding. It had been 
commonly accepted that since a juvenile proceeding was neither criminal nor punitive, a 
subsequent proceeding in which the juvenile was prosecuted as an adult was not barred. 
The holding in Breed, 421 U.S. at 529, implicitly rejected the logic of cases such as 
In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1959), which had stated: 
Innocence or guilt are not in issue, but an adjudication of the child's status is. 
Retribution and punishment are not its purposes, but protection and rehabilitation 
of the child are. And if the detriments and stigma of a criminal trial do not attach 
to the juvenile before this court, then it follows that neither does he have the right 
to be tried as a criminal. 
The Breed holding suggests that the distinction between juvenile and criminal pro-
ceedings is being eroded. While that distinction is still viable for some purposes, witness 
McKeiver, the Court is apparently taking a hard look at the procedural disparities and 
striking down those unrelated to the purposes of juvenile hearings. 
135. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). 
136. See text following note 84 supra. 
137. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1973). 
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between the liberty interests of the parolee and the juvenile. 
Finding those interests constitutionally indistinguishable, it pro-
poses that the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
counsel, and the reasonable-doubt standard be extended to pa-
role revocation. The Part concludes by examining the effect of 
those changes on parole-revocation proceedings and arguing that 
the changes would not significantly undermine any state interest. 
The Court's assumption that the juvenile is differently situ-
ated from, and entitled to a greater degree of protection than, the 
parolee suggests that the Court thinks the juvenile's interest is 
somehow different from, and more important than, the pa-
rolee's. But as will be seen, the interests are, for constitutional 
purposes, indistinguishable. 
First, the parolee's interest, like the juvenile's, is liberty 
rather than property. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in 
Morrissey, likened the grant of parole to a deed and the resultant 
liberty to a property interest. 138 But that argument overlooks the 
important point that when the state grants parole, it simply re-
moves the restrictions imposed by imprisonment. The parolee 
becomes free to act in any way not prohibited by the law or his 
parole conditions. That freedom to act is not, however, created 
by the grant of parole, but is restored by it. Such freedom was 
liberty before his incarceration, and it is liberty after he is re-
leased on parole. 139 That the state need not have removed the 
restrictions and may reinstitute them if the parolee violates pa-
role conditions does not change the nature of the parolee's inter-
est. As the Court observed in Morrissey, that interest "includes 
138. 408 U.S. 471, 493 (1972). 
139. This notion of "natural liberty" was well stated by Justice Stevens in his dissent 
in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976), in which the Court held that the fourteenth 
amendment's due process clause does not entitle a state prison inmate to a fact-finding 
hearing prior to being transferred to a state prison whose conditions are substantially less 
favorable to him. In rejecting the majority's argument that liberty interests originate 
either in the Constitution or in state law, Justice Stevens said: 
If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. But neither 
the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due 
Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on 
the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state 
laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who 
must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and 
enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of 
liberty, and surely not the exclusive source. 
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with 
liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the 
Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges con-
ferred by specific laws or regulations. 
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many of the core values of unqualified liberty ."140 Thus, in parole 
revocation, as in delinquency hearings, the interest at stake is 
liberty. 
Yet, it might be argued, the parolee's liberty is different from 
the juvenile's because it is conditioned upon his observance of 
parole conditions. Parole conditions do limit the parolee's liberty. 
But the state also limits the juvenile's liberty by laws not applica-
ble to adults. For example, children generally may not purchase 
intoxicants, operate motor vehicles; or stay home from school. 
Juveniles who repeatedly violate such restrictions may be institu-
tionalized. 141 fu this significant sense, the juvenile's liberty, like 
the parolee's liberty, is conditional. 
Furthermore, the effect of an erroneous decision on a parolee 
is not less than the effect of an erroneous decision on a juvenile. 
Parole permits the individual to hold a job, to be with family and 
friends, to build a normal life142-in short, to begin to regulate his 
own activities. If the parolee abides by the conditions of his pa-
role, he is entitled to retain this freedom. 143 A mistaken finding 
that he violated parole deprives him of this liberty, a consequence 
as serious, a disaster as painful, 144 as if he had been mistakenly : 
140. 408 U.S. at 482. 
141. See, e.g., Amz. REv. STAT. § 8-201-8 (1974), defining a delinquent act to include 
"any act that would constitute a public offense which could only be committed by a child 
or by a minor"; § 8-201-9 ·defining a delinquent child as "a child who is adju-
dicated to have committed a delinquent act"; § 8-241-(A)(2)(e) permitting the 
juvenile court to remand a delinquent child "[t]o the department of corrections." 
142. [P]erole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted crimi-
nals. Its purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive 
individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the 
sentence imposed. It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an 
individual in prison. The essence of parole is release from prison, before the comple-
tion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during 
the balance of the sentence. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). 
144. "Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free 
or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the depriva-
tion of good time is not the same immediate disaster that revocation of parole is for the 
parolee." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974). 
In Wolff, the Court recognized that a state prison inmate's "interest [in retaining 
"good time" credits] has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth 
Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the 
circumstances and required by the due process clause to insure that the state-created right 
is not arbitrarily abrogated," 418 U.S. at 557. While the Court noted that the prisoner's 
interest is not as significantly affected by deprivation of "good time" as is the parolee's 
by revocation, 418 U.S. at 561, it nevertheless found such deprivation to be "a matter of 
considerable importance." But the major factor which rendered the Morrissey procedures 
partially inapplicable was "the very different stake the State has in the structure and 
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convicted of a crime. 
Of course, it might be argued that, while an adjudication of 
delinquency deprives the juvenile of future unqualified liberty, 
parole revocation merely substitutes imprisonment for parole, 
i.e., for only qualified liberty. But if his parole is revoked for a 
criminal violation, the federal parolee loses credit for time spent 
on parole.145 This, by extending the period in which his liberty is 
content of the prison disciplinary hearing." 418 U.S. at 561. Noting that "[p]rison disci-
plinary hearings ••• take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment[,]" 418 U.S. 
at 561, and that "imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations 
between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those 
who would charge or furnish evidence against them," 418 u.a. at 562, the Court held that 
the rights of confrontation and croBS-examination, 418 U.S. at 567-68, and the right to 
counsel, 418 U.S. at 570, did not apply. Nevertheless, the mere recognition that even a 
prison inmate has a protectable liberty interest emphasizes the much greater interest of 
the parolee in retaining his liberty. 
145. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). The denial of credit for time 
spent on parole or "street time" dates from the original statute, An Act To parole United 
States prisoners, ch. 387, § 6, 36 Stat. 820 (1910): "If such order of parole shall be revoked 
and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence 
originally imposed; and the time the prisoner was out on parole shall not be taken into 
account to diminish the time for which he was sentenced." 
This was subsequently combined with other provisions for arrest of the parole viola-
tor: 
A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his 
parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and within 
the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unexpired term of 
imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the date he is returned 
to the custody of the Attorney General under said warrant, and the time the pris-
oner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve. 
Retaking Parole Violator Under Warrant; Time To Serve Undiminished, ch. 311, § 4205, 
62 Stat. 854 (1948). 
Under the Federal Parole CommiBBion and Reorganization Act, 18 U.$.C. §§ 4201-
4218 (1976), the provision for denial of credit for street time is not quite so explicit. Sec-
tion 4210(b)(2) provides that in the case of a parolee who has been convicted of a subse-
quent crime, "the Commission shall determine • • • whether all or any part of the unex-
pired term being served at the time of parole shall run concurrently or consecutively with 
the sentence imposed for the new offense." According to the legislative history of the Act, 
H.R. REP. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 32 (1976), 
This subsection also provides that an individual whose parole has been revoked 
upon conviction of any new criminal offense • . • shall receive no credit for service 
of his sentence from the day he is released on parole until he either returns to 
Federal custody following completion of any sentence of incarceration or upon the 
Commission determining that the sentence run concurrently with any new sentence 
that may have been imposed. 
In other words, a conviction resulting in revocation requires a loss of street time, but the 
Commission may make the unexpired portion run concurrently with any new sentence. 
In the case of the parolee charged with but not convicted of a criminal violation, the 
Commission must conduct both of the hearings required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a). But a 
finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence may result in revocation here as 
well as in the case of the parolee who has been convicted. While the Commission must 
consider the fact or absence of a criminal conviction in deciding whether to revoke parole, 
18 U.S.C. § 4214(d), no conviction is required for revocation. 
No explicit provisfon is made for loss of street time by parolees not convicted in a 
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restricted, has the effect of extending his sentence and constitutes 
a new penalty rather than a carrying out of an old one. Further-
more, since the length of the extension depends on the amount 
of time spent on parole rather than on the violation charged, the 
penalty imposed by revocation may be far more severe than the 
statutory maximum under the criminal law.146 In a real sense, 
then, a parole-revocation proceeding is comparable in seriousness 
to a delinquency hearing. 147 
criminal prosecution, but the absence thereof was probably an oversight, since that sanc-
tion was retained in the case of the convicted parolee and since no language in either the 
Act or the legislative history declares an intent to effect any change from the old act. 
Contrast this with the presence of language in the legislative history, H.R. REP. No. 94-
838, at 32,. to the effect that a parolee who is reincarcerated for a violation other than 
"commission" of a crime retains credit for street time. If Congress had desired to allow 
credit for street time when parole was revoked on the basis of an unproved criminal charge, 
this intention could similarly have been affirmatively indicated in the act or the legislative 
history. 
In short, while Congress did not explicitly provide for the denial of credit for street 
time, Congress has shown no intention to change its earlier policy, except in the case of 
technical violations, where the change is explicit. Thus it may be inferred that parole 
revocation based upon a criminal charge must result in loss of credit for street time unless 
the Commission chooses to allow the sentence to run concurrently with any sentence 
imposed for the crime committed while on parole. 
Many states provide similar penalties for parole violations. See Arluke, A Summary 
of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 267, 271 (1969). 
146. For example, assume that a parolee bas spent eight years on parole when his 
parole is revoked for a crime punishable under the criminal law by no more than three 
years' imprisonment. Because he receives no credit for time spent on parole, the parolee's 
sentence is extended by eight years, five more than could be imposed in a new criminal 
prosecution on the same charge. Cf. Murray v. Page, 429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970) (parole 
summarily revoked after eight years). 
147. It might be argued that juvenile-procedure safeguards are simply a response to 
the possibility that the proceeding will stigmatize the juvenile, and it is true that, while 
a parolee has already been convicted of a crime, a delinquent may have had no prior 
trouble with the law. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of persons who come before 
the juvenile court may be termed recidivists who have already been stigmatized. See, e.g., 
REPOIIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 773 (1966) 
(cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967)) (in fiscal 1965, 61% of persons referred to the 
Juvenile Receiving Home had been previously referred, and 42% had been referred at least 
twice before). 
Moreover, a parolee whose parole is revoked is equally stigmatized. First and most 
important, the revocation reflects a finding that the parolee has violated his parole, often 
by committing a crime. That this finding is supported by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence is irrelevant-the stigma inherent in an adjudication of delinquency was one of 
the factors that motivated the Winship court to require the reasonable-doubt standard, 
397 U.S. at 367. Second, the fact of and reasons for the revocation become a part of the 
parolee's record and are considered in deciding whether parole should be granted when 
the individual again becomes eligible, 18 U.S.C. § 4207(2)(1976), as well as in future 
sentencing decisions, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(d)(1976). (Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
366-67(1970), where the Court found that stigma inhered in adjudication of delinquency 
despite the fact that New York law provided that such adjudication did not constitute a 
criminal conviction, did not deprive the juvenile of his civil rights, and was kept confiden-
tial). Thus, the potential for stigmatization does not distinguish juvenile hearings from 
parole-revocation proceedings. 
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If neither the nature and conditions of the parolee's liberty 
nor the consequences of its termination distinguishes the pa-
rolee's interest from the juvenile's, what distinction between 
those interests might explain the disparity in procedural rights? 
The distinction most readers are likely to perceive-and, this 
Note suggests, the one which influenced the Court-is that, while 
the juvenile's liberty is his birthright, the parolee's is the product 
of his release on parole. Or, to describe the distinction differently, 
since the state could simply have kept the parolee in prison, his 
liberty is merely a privilege not entitled to the same protection 
as that of the juvenile. 
While it is intuitively appealing, however, this argument 
simply reiterates the right-privilege distinction, a tautology 
which the Court has rejected.148 Whatever it might have done, 149 
the state did grant parole. The question is what due process re-
quires when the state seeks to revoke that grant. 150 To character-
ize the parolee's liberty as a "privilege" is merely to assert that 
the state will not protect it to the same extent that it protects a 
"right." If, for example, the parolee could not be deprived of his 
liberty unless a violation were proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
in a proceeding which afforded a full array of safeguards, that 
liberty, once granted, would be a "right" as surely as is the liberty 
of the juvenile. "Right" and "privilege" are thus conclusory la-
bels, and the right-privilege distinction states only a tautology: 
Because the state does not protect the parolee's liberty to the 
same extent that it protects that of the juvenile, the parolee's 
liberty is a privilege; because it is a privilege, that liberty is not 
entitled to the same degree of protection as the liberty of the 
juvenile.151 To distinguish the liberty interest of the parolee from 
148. See text at note 63 supra. 
149. It is by no means clear that the corrections system could survive in its present 
form if the state did not grant parole in a large number of cases. See note 176 infra. 
150. It might be argued that since the state need not grant parole, it can condition 
the grant on the waiver of the parolee's right to demand due process in revocation. Similar 
arguments were advanced prior to the Morrissey decision. See note 20 supra (contract 
theory). The fundamental problem with the argument is that it would permit the condi-
tioning of the grant on the waiver of constitutional rights, a result prohibited by the 
Court's decisions: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, 
by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by 
the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accom-
plished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege 
which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. 
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commn., 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). See Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (state may not condition unemployment benefits on 
the recipient's waiver of right to observe the sabbath on Saturday). 
151. See Van Alst~e, supra note 45, at 1460. The right-privilege distinction was first 
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that of the juvenile on the basis of this rationale is to hang an 
intuitive result on an illusory peg. 
To summarize, the liberty interests of the parolee and juve-
nile are, for constitutional purposes, indistinguishable. The na-
tures of those interests are the same; both are conditional; the 
consequences of deprivation are equally onerous; and characteri-
zations as "rights" or "privileges" reflect, rather than determine, 
due process. 
enunciated by Justice Holmes, who was writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 
(1892). In that case the court denied relief to a policeman who had been qischarged for 
violation of a regulation which restricted his political activity. Holmes dismissed the first 
amendment argument: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 
Professor Van Alstyne, in the seminal article on the right-privilege distinction, dem-
onstrated that Holmes' epigram, and, in effect, the right-privilege distinction itself, stated 
a mere truism. 
Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny that a person had a "right" to 
something was merely to announce the conclusion that a court would not give any: 
relief; but the denial itself provides no reason why such relief should be denied. 
The impact of the McAuliffe epigram on succeeding generations of courts has 
been a dual one. As used by Holmes it represents the inference that because public · 
employment is not protected, retention of that privilege may be conditioned on the 
giving up of first amendment rights. This non sequitur has been exposed and 
rejected by the courts applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The more 
invidious impact of the epigram, however, has been its use to supply a reason why 
public status is not protected in the first place - because such status is a privilege 
rather than a right. But as Holmes' own analysis shows, the epigram on this point 
yields no reason at all. If we take it as stating a reason, contrary to Holmes' 
intention, it becomes a perfectly circular argument. 
Van Alystyne, supra note 45, at 1459-60 (footnotes omitted). 
The right-privilege analysis wrongly presupposes a difference in the extent to which 
the parolee and juvenile are entitled to be free of arbitrary governmental action. The 
problem was most acute in the pre-Morrissey days, when it was commonly thought that 
revocation of parole was a matter entirely within the discretion of the parole board. The 
distinction between the situation of the juvenile and that of the parolee was thought to 
be that the juvenile had a right to be free from arbitrary governmental action to curtail 
his liberty, while the parolee did not. But there is no such independent right. 
[Dlue process is not itself a protected entitlement. Rather, the sole protected 
interests are "life, liberty, [and] property." Due process stands in relation to these 
not as an equivalent constitutionally established entitlement, but only as a condi-
tion to be observed insofar as the state may move to imperil one of the named 
substantive interests. 
Van Alystyne, supra note 32, at 452. The juvenile's due process rights derive from the fact 
that his liberty is imperiled. The recognition that the parolee's interest is also liberty led 
the Court in Morrissey to provide due process protection in parole revocation. 
Yet the Court has not completely divested itself of the remnants of the old distinction. 
The Court determined the content of due process in the parole-revocation proceeding by 
the untested assumption that the juvenile is entitled to a higher degree of protection. But 
the Court's assumption depends upon the very due process protection it purports to 
determine and is, for this reason, entirely circular. 
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_ Because the liberty interest of the parolee is like that of the 
juvenile and unlike that of the welfare recipient, the juvenile 
model of procedural safeguards is the appropriate one for parole 
revocation. The rights to receive advance notification of charges, 
to appear and present evidence, to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, and to receive a written explanation of the 
decision are secured, of course, in the Goldberg model as well as 
the juvenile model. But the additional rights afforded by the 
juvenile model-the privilege against self-incrimination, repre-
sent~tion by counsel, and the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt-are necessary to protect adequately the parolee's 
liberty interest. 
Yet three factors determine the content of due process in any 
given situation: 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the spe-
cific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of 
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the proba-
ble value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.152 
This Note has shown that the individual's interest-
liberty-is as important in parole revocations as in delinquency 
hearings153 and that the risk of erroneously depriving the parolee 
of liberty is too high under Morrissey. 154 We must, therefore, con-
sider the probable value of the proposed additional rights and 
their effect upon the state's interests. 
The state's interests are by no means uniformly opposed to 
enhanced due process rights for parolees; On one hand, the state 
is interested in returning parole violators to prison promptly and 
without the expense or burden of a new adversary criminal pro-
ceeding. 155 To this might be added a state interest in deterring 
antisocial conduct by minimizing procedural safeguards so that 
any errors in fact-finding cause parole to be revoked rather than 
continued. On the other hand, the state is interested in continu-
ing parole if the parolee has not, in fact, violated any restrictions: 
152. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
153. See text at notes 138-51 supra. 
154. See text at notes 90-100 supra. 
155. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). 
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an erroneous revocation is an expensive mistake156 which may 
embitter the parolee and decrease the chance that he will be 
rehabilitated.157 This interest in continuing parole favors adding 
procedural safeguards to increase the accuracy of fact-finding and 
markedly weakens the state's contrary interest in reducing those 
safeguards. Applying the juvenile model of due process to parole 
revocation is fully consistent with the state's interest in accuracy, 
and doing so would not significantly interfere with its contrary 
interests in keeping proceedings simple and in returning actual 
violators to prison. All this being so, the societal value of each of 
the proposed safeguards outweighs any net detriment to the state 
of that safeguard, as the following paragraphs show. 
First, the privilege against self-incrimination would be an 
important addition to a parolee's rights. The privilege would as-
sure that confessions or admissions are trustworthy and not the 
product of fear, coercion, or the parolee's belief that the alterna-
tives associated with silence are worse.158 Further, it would pre-
clude the sub rosa shifting of the burden of proof to the parolee: 
his failure to testify could not become the basis for adverse infer-
ences. Finally, the privilege would allow a parolee charged with 
a crime to receive fair treatment at the revocation hearing with-
out having to reveal the defenses he will assert at his trial. 159 
Neither would the self-incrimination privilege cripple the 
state's interests. The enhanced trustworthiness of confessions 
would further the state's interest in accuracy. Moreover, it would 
cost the state nothing to allow the parolee to remain silent. Nor 
would the privilege complicate the proceeding: indeed, the ab-
156. See note 176 infra. 
157. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972): 
The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society 
has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful 
life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked 
because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need 
to revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions. . . . And society has a 
further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole 
revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbi-
trariness. 
(citations omitted). 
158. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). 
159. See Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 74 MtCH. L. REV. 525, 536-37 
(1976). The possibility of a criminal prosecution should itself justify providing the privi-
lege to parolees: "The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . and it protec.ts any disclo-
sures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring). 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:120 
sence of the parolee's testimony might speed its conclusion. The 
only interest that would be compromised by the availability of 
the privilege is the state's interest in erring on the side of revoca-
tion. That interest, this Note asserts, is simply outweighed by the 
many interests favoring the privilege. 
Second, the value of the right to counsel is well known. Rep-
resentation by counsel would improve the development and pre-
sentation of possible defenses. Unlike the jailed parolee, a lawyer 
would have the mobility to acquire information and the skill to 
present it effectively. Furthermore, representation by counsel 
would make meaningful the parolee's right to test the credibility 
of adverse witnesses through cross-examination. 
The right to counsel is consistent with the state's interest in 
reaching a correct decision. And, while the right could make the 
revocation proceeding somewhat more expensive and compli-
cated, the Court has recognized that, in at least some revocation 
proceedings, the state's interest in saving time and money is sim-
ply outweighed by the need for counsel. Thus, the Court held in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli160 that an indigent parolee who asserts a col-
orable claim of innocence is entitled to appointed counsel. 181 The 
Court found that "the unskilled or uneducated probationer or 
parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a 
disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examin-
ing or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting 
of complex documentary evidence."162 The Court acknowledged 
. that requiring appointed counsel would impose additional costs 
and prolong the proceeding.163 But it held that when the effective-
ness of the Morrissey rights depends upon skills which the parolee 
lacks, the state's interest in efficiency must yield to the interest 
of the parolee and to the state's interest in correct decisions. 18~ 
This "colorable claim" standard, however, depends upon the 
Parole Commission's assessment of the merits of the parolee's 
defense, merits which are presented without the assistance of 
counsel. In such cases, the right to counsel depends on the assist-
ance of counsel. For perhaps that reason, Congress has created a 
statutory right to retained or appointed counsel in federal parole-
revocation proceedings; 165 Congress believed that the govern-
160. 411 U.S. 778 (1973); see note 77 supra. 
161. 411 U.S. at 787. 
162. 411 U.S. at 787. 
163. 411 U.S. at 788. 
164. 411 U.S. at 786-88. 
165. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1976). 
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ment's interest in saving time and money is outweighed by the 
interest of all parties in a correct result. The interests favoring a 
correct result are, of course, equally strong in state revocation 
proceedings, and therefore constitutional underpinnings for the 
federal statutory right are needed to eliminate the chicken-and-
egg "colorable claim" standard which now allocates the right in 
state revocation proceedings. 
Third, the reasonable-doubt standard would reduce the mar-
gin of error in acknowledgement of the transcendent value of the 
interest at stake, the parolee's liberty.166 Moreover, because of 
factors peculiar to the parolee's situation, the state's interest in 
reincarcerating actual parole violators would be adequately 
served by a reasonable-doubt standard. First, the parolee is sub-
ject to many specific restrictions, violations of which are objec-
tively demonstrable without regard to his intent. 167 Proof of parole 
violation is correspondingly simplified. Second, because the 
parolee's conduct is monitored by his parole officer, evidence of 
violations is more easily discovered than evidence of a crime. For 
example, parole conditions may require that the parolee permit 
his parole officer to visit his home at any reasonable hour. 168 Fur-
thermore, search warrants are probably more freely issued in the 
case of a parolee than an ordinary citizen.169 Third, the hearing's 
flexible procedure admits evidence such as letters, affidavits, and 
other material170 which would not be admissible in a criminal 
166. See text at note 128 supra. 
167. Virtually all parole conditions, except the condition which prohibits criminal 
violations, are prohibitions of specific acts such as consuming alcoholic beverages, driving 
an automobile without permission, or leaving the jurisdiction. See Jones v. Cunningham, 
371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963). By contrast, intent, or mens rea, is a necessary element of most 
crimes, see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and creates problems 
of proof whenever the defendant claims that the act was accidental. 
There are, however, limits to the state's ability to impose strict liabilty for parole 
violations. For example, in Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971), the Court held that 
unauthorized contacts with other ex-convicts were insufficient to justify parole revocation, 
since those contacts had been with other employees in the course of employment. Cf. 
United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1963) (revocation may not be based upon 
nonpayment of a fine where the probationer pleads pauperism, since this would defeat 
congressional intent to allow release on the pauper's oath, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3569, 3651 (1976), 
of federal prisoners imprisoned for failure to pay fines). 
But in most cases, parole may be revoked if the parolee is shown to have committed 
an act prohibited by his parole conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d) (1976). See Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
168. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963). 
169. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 338-39 (1971). See al~o 
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978). 
170. "Other material" has, in some cases, included evidence obtained through illegal 
search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United 
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Dowery, 20 
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proceeding.171 Fourth, the revocation proceeding is conducted by 
the Parole Commission, 172 the members of which are experienced 
fact-finders who are less likely than a jury to be swayed by advo-
cacy or pangs of sympathy for a parolee. 173 The reasonable-doubt 
standard would not alter the informality, flexibility, or speed of 
the hearing which finds facts. 174 It would simply require that the 
trier of fact be more confident that the parolee did the act with 
which he is charged. 175 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the juvenile model of due process is the appropriate 
one for parole-revocation proceedings. The parolee's liberty inter-
est is constitutionally indistinguishable from and equal in im-
portance to the juvenile's. Moreover, no interest of the state is so 
significant that it justifies denying such safeguards to parolees. 
The juvenile model would not make the revocation proceeding 
significantly more difficult or expensive to administer, and any 
resulting problems of proof would be offset by the peculiar advan-
tages the state would continue to have in parole-revocation pro-
ceedings.176 
Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974), affd., 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); Stone 
v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973). Furthermore, at least one court has admitted 
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights. See Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 
102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973). 
171. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
172. 18 u.s.c. § 4214 (1976). 
173. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 231, 242 n.19 (1963). 
174. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970). See text at note 126 supra. 
175. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (application of 
the reasonable-doubt standard merely "requires a juvenile judge to be more confident in 
his belief that the youth did the act with which he has been charged"). 
176. See text at notes 165-75 supra. 
It might be thought that the practical effect of applying the juvenile model to parole-
revocation proceedings will be to make the state reluctant to grant parole in the first place, 
Such fears motivated the Eighth Circuit to hold due process inapplicable to parole revoca-
tion proceedings, Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 1971), but, as the 
Supreme Court stated in reversing that decision, "Serious studies have suggested that fair 
treatment on parole revocation will not result in fewer grants of parole." 408 U.S. 471, 483 
(1972) (citing Sklar, [,aw and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 
J. CruM. L.C. & P.S. 175, 194 (1964)). Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the state 
can financially afford to reduce the number of grants of parole, for the cost of imprison-
ment is much greater than the cost of parole supervision. See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 
91, 102 n.16 (6th Cir. 1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (cost of imprisonment is as much 
as 10 times the cost of parole supervision). 
It is, however, possible that applying the juvenile model might cause some states to 
eliminate parole entirely and to substitute a system of shorter prison sentences. This 
would be unfortunate, since parole is a process of treatment whereby the parolee can, 
under the guidance of his parole officer, learn to regulate his own activities within the 
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At present, the risk of erroneously depriving the parolee of his 
liberty is intolerably high. The procedural safeguards now avail-
able were designed to protect the less significant property interest 
of the welfare recipient. The interest at stake is simply too impor-
tant to allow mere administrative convenience or outmoded no-
tions of rights and privileges to justify arbitrary decisions. Noth-
ing less than the juvenile model of procedural safeguards, includ-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, 
and the reasonable-doubt standard, can afford protection com-
mensurate with the transcentlent value of the parolee's liberty. 
Due process demands no less.177 
framework of the law and his parole conditions, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 
(1972); opportunities for self,rregulation are, of necessity, lacking in prison. Furthermore, 
"for at least some prisoners, parole is considered a more effective form of custody than 
physical incarceration, more likely to achieve society's goal of treatment of the prisoner 
to prevent future crimes." Bates v. Rivers, 323 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., 
dissenting). It might thus be better in the long run to allow some parole violators to go 
free than to eliminate the system totally. But while the possibility that adopting the 
juvenile model might endanger the system cannot be discounted entirely, that possibility 
cannot be permitted to overcome the demand of the Constitution that the parolee's liberty 
be adequately protected. 
177. Because the reasonable-doubt standard should be extended to parole-revocation 
hearings, a parolee who faces revocation in consequence of an alleged criminal violation 
would receive not only the protection of the greater degree of certitude demanded of the 
trier of fact but of collateral estoppel as well. Standlee, thus, would have been acquitted 
of violating his parole, since he had been found not guilty in the criminal prosecution. See 
text at notes 2-3 supra. That result follows from the holding in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 ll.S. 
436 (1970), that collateral estoppel inheres in the fifth amendment's double jeopardy 
guarantee: "Whatever else that constitutional guarantee may embrace ... it surely pro-
tects a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." 397 
U.S. at 446 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 187, 190 (1957)). 

